首页> 外文会议>Proceedings of the sixth international symposium of corporate governance >An Empirical Study on Relationship Between Governance Mechanism of Debt Financing and Corporate Comprehensive Performance
【24h】

An Empirical Study on Relationship Between Governance Mechanism of Debt Financing and Corporate Comprehensive Performance

机译:债务融资的治理机制与公司综合绩效之间关系的实证研究

获取原文
获取原文并翻译 | 示例

摘要

The relationship between corporate governance mechanism of debt financing and corporate comprehensive performance has been studied in this paper based on the financial data of 1110 listed companies. Effects of four approaches of debt financing mechanism working on corporate performance have also been analyzed thoroughly. It has been found out that,in most of the listed companies of China, functions of debt financing mechanisms are worsening. Among all of these four approaches,controller benefit's incentive mechanism and restrictive mechanism of free cash flow can help promote comprehensive performance by successfully inspiring shareholders' motivation to take part in corporate governance on one hand and restricting the possibility of managers' abusing free cash flow on the other. However,financial leverage's worsening and the failure of information transmission mechanism have weakened the positive effect of debt governance mechanism towards corporate comprehensive performance on the whole.
机译:基于1110家上市公司的财务数据,研究了债务融资的公司治理机制与公司综合绩效之间的关系。还详细分析了债务融资机制的四种工作方式对公司绩效的影响。已经发现,在中国大多数上市公司中,债务融资机制的功能正在恶化。在这四种方法中,控制者利益的激励机制和自由现金流的约束机制一方面可以成功地激发股东参与公司治理的动机,并限制管理者滥用自由现金流的可能性,从而有助于提升综合绩效。另一个。但是,财务杠杆的恶化和信息传递机制的失败削弱了债务治理机制对企业整体绩效的积极作用。

著录项

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱:kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备:11010802029741号 ICP备案号:京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有
  • 客服微信

  • 服务号