首页> 外文会议>Pacific-Asia Conference on Knowledge Engineering and Software Engineering >Game Analysis on the Double Principal-Agent Risk in Risk Investment
【24h】

Game Analysis on the Double Principal-Agent Risk in Risk Investment

机译:风险投资双重委托 - 代理风险的游戏分析

获取原文

摘要

In the risk investment system, whether the double principal-agent relationship which is formed by different interest subjects can smoothly operate is the key to determine the success of risk investment, yet the issue of information asymmetry in the field is more serious than other industry, so that double principal - agent relationship formed in it exists huge risks. A series of binding agreements and institutional arrangements can be reached among different interest subjects and strictly observed by all game parties, then this cooperative game can make the parties have sustained and stable income, and reached the win-win cooperation of game with incomplete information, so as to effectively restrain the double principal-agent risk.
机译:在风险投资系统中,不同利益科目形成的双重委托 - 代理关系是否可以顺利运作是确定风险投资成功的关键,但该领域的信息不对称问题比其他行业更严重,因此,在它中形成的双重委托 - 代理关系存在巨大的风险。在不同的利息科目和所有游戏缔约方严格遵守的一系列绑定协议和机构安排,那么这款合作游戏可以使各方具有持续稳定的收入,并达到了不完整信息的游戏双赢合作,以便有效抑制双重委托人风险。

著录项

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱:kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备:11010802029741号 ICP备案号:京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有
  • 客服微信

  • 服务号