The three equilibriums of Benefit-Seeking behavior of consuming weak regenerative resource and the influence of the scale of collective on efficiency

摘要

The equilibrium curve and model of common weak regenerative resource under the benefit-seeking behavior are deduced based on the regeneration speed model of resource and the consumption model of benefit-seeking behavior. Different equilibrium points of individual irrationality, individual rationality and collective rationality are deduced from these models and the relationships of these points are also analyzed. The scale of collective influents the profit of benefit-seeking behavior. This influence is discussed at the end of this paper and two important conclusions are put forward. Firstly, excessive benefit-seeking behavior will happen in case that the number of units is too large and no controls are taken by the managers, which will bring serious destroy on the resource. Secondly, without affecting the function of resource, the common recourse should be divided as small as possible so that the collective who occupies the resource can be divided as small as possible. So the management cost of protecting resource can reach the lowest and the long-term profit of benefit-seeking behavior will be the highest.