The devil and the deep sea - economics, institutions and incentives: the theory and the New Zealand quota management experience in the deep sea

摘要

This paper will look at three key questions in fisheries management. i. Does theory suggest a property rights regime can be relied on to protect fish stocks and the environment of the deep sea! ii. Has the New Zealand property rights based Quota Management System (QMS) been a success in terms of its management of fish stocks and the environment in the deep sea! iii. What lessons can be learned for the deep sea from the New Zealand experience! To address these questions, this paper canvasses basic economic theory including harvesting theory predictions and draws on theory of property rights, institutions and incentives and commonly expressed expectations about property rights. The paper briefly outlines the salient elements of the evolution of New Zealand's QMS. It examines the empirical record to determine what has happened in management of deep-sea fisheries in New Zealand. In the light of both the theory and the New Zealand experience, it then addresses how this informs choices for the deep sea.