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Reasoning with Past to Prove PKCS#11 Keys Secure

机译:推理过去证明PKCS#11键安全

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PKCS#11 is a widely adopted standard that defines a security API for accessing devices such as smartcards and hardware security modules. Motivated by experiments on several devices we develop an approach that allows us to formally establish security properties of keys stored on such devices. We use first-order linear time logic extended by past operators. The expressiveness of a first-order language allows us to model the security API and its features close to how it is specified while the past operators enable proof by backwards analysis. We apply this approach to prove that keys that initially have the attribute extractable set to false are secure.
机译:PKCS#11是广泛采用的标准,用于定义用于访问诸如智能卡和硬件安全模块等设备的安全API。通过关于几种设备的实验激励,我们开发一种方法,允许我们正式建立存储在此类设备上的密钥的安全性。我们使用过去的运算符扩展的一阶线性时间逻辑。一阶语言的表达力允许我们建模安全API及其功能,而是靠近其在过去的操作员通过倒退分析启用证明时的指定。我们应用此方法来证明最初具有可提取的设置为false的键是安全的。

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