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Uncertainty in Interdependent Security Games

机译:相互依存安全游戏的不确定性

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Even the most well-motivated models of information security have application limitations due to the inherent uncertainties involving risk. This paper exemplifies a formal mechanism for resolving this kind of uncertainty in interdependent security (IDS) scenarios. We focus on a single IDS model involving a computer network, and adapt the model to capture a notion that players have only a very rough idea of security threats and underlying structural ramifications. We formally resolve uncertainty by means of a probability distribution on risk parameters that is common knowledge to all players. To illustrate how this approach might yield fruitful applications, we postulate a well-motivated distribution, compute Bayesian Nash equilibria and tipping conditions for the derived model, and compare these with the analogous conditions for the original IDS model.
机译:即使是由于涉及风险的固有的不确定性,即使是最良好的信息安全模式也具有应用限制。本文举例说明了在相互依存的安全性(IDS)场景中解决这种不确定性的正式机制。我们专注于涉及计算机网络的单个IDS模型,并调整模型来捕获玩家只有安全威胁和潜在的结构后果概念的概念。我们通过对所有球员的普通知识的风险参数进行概率分布正式解决不确定性。为了说明这种方法如何产生富有成效的应用程序,我们假设一个激进的分布,计算越来越多的派生模型的倾翻条件,并将这些与原始IDS模型的类似条件进行比较。

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