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On the Complexity of Equilibria Problems in Angel-Daemon Games

机译:论Angel-Daemon游戏中均衡问题的复杂性

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We analyze the complexity of equilibria problems for a class of strategic zero-sum games, called Angel-Daemon games. Those games were introduced to asses the goodness of a web or grid orchestration on a faulty environment with bounded amount of failures [6]. It turns out that Angel-Daemon games are, at the best of our knowledge, the first natural example of zero-sum succinct games in the sense of [1],[9]. We show that deciding the existence of a pure Nash equilibrium or a dominant strategy for a given player is ∑{sub}2{sup}p-complete. Furthermore, computing the value of an Angel-Daemon game is EXP-complete. Thus, matching the already known complexity results of the corresponding problems for the generic families of succinctly represented games with exponential number of actions.
机译:我们分析了一类战略零和游戏的均衡问题的复杂性,称为Angel-Daemon游戏。引入了这些游戏,以赋予Web或网格编排的良好对具有有界失败量的错误环境[6]。事实证明,Angel-Daemon游戏是在我们的知识中,在[1],[9]的意义上,零简化游戏的第一个自然典范。我们表明,确定给定播放器的纯NASH均衡或主导策略的存在是Σ{sub} 2 {sup} p-temply。此外,计算Angel-Daemon游戏的值是Exp-Treate。因此,匹配已知的复杂性结果对具有指数级操作的简习型游戏的通用族的相应问题。

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