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Multi-stage Dynamic Information Flow Tracking Game

机译:多阶段动态信息流跟踪游戏

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Advanced persistent threats (APTs) consist of multiple attack stages between entry and exit points of the attack. In each stage of the attack, the adversary gathers more privileges, resources, and information about the system and uses this information to gain access to the targeted data of the next stage to reach the final goal. APTs are not only persistent but also stealthy and hence difficult to detect. The persistent nature of APTs, however, creates information flows in the system that can be monitored. One monitoring mechanism is Dynamic Information Flow Tracking (DIFT), which taints and tracks malicious information flows through a system and inspects the flows at designated traps. Since tainting all flows in the system will incur prohibitive resource costs, efficient tagging policies are needed to decide which flows to tag in order to maximize the probability of APT detection while minimizing resource overhead. At present such an analytical model for DIFT for multi-stage APT detection does not exist. In this paper, we propose a game theoretic framework modeling real-time detection of multi-stage APTs via DIFT. We formulate a two-player (APT vs DIFT) nonzero-sum stochastic game with incomplete information to obtain an optimal tagging policy. Our game model consists of a sequence of stages, where each stage of the game corresponds to a stage in the attack. At each stage, the goal of the APT is to reach a particular destination, corresponding to a targeted resource or privilege, while the goal of the defender is to detect the APT. We first derive an efficient algorithm to find locally optimal strategies for both players. We then characterize the best responses of both players and present algorithms to find the best responses. Finally, we validate our results on a real-world attack data set obtained using the Refinable Attack INvestigation (RAIN) framework for a ScreenGrab attack.
机译:高级持续威胁(APT)由攻击的入口点和出口点之间的多个攻击阶段组成。在攻击的每个阶段,对手都收集有关系统的更多特权,资源和信息,并使用此信息来访问下一阶段的目标数据以达到最终目标。 APT不仅持久而且隐身,因此很难被发现。但是,APT的持久性会在系统中创建可监视的信息流。动态信息流跟踪(DIFT)是一种监视机制,该机制可污染和跟踪通过系统的恶意信息流并检查指定陷阱处的流。由于污染系统中的所有流将招致过高的资源成本,因此需要有效的标记策略来确定要标记的流,以便在最大程度地减少资源开销的同时最大程度地检测APT。目前,不存在用于多阶段APT检测的用于DIFT的这种分析模型。在本文中,我们提出了一种通过DIFT对多级APT进行实时检测的游戏理论框架。我们制定了具有不完整信息的两人(APT vs DIFT)非零和随机游戏,以获得最佳标记策略。我们的游戏模型由一系列阶段组成,其中游戏的每个阶段对应于攻击中的一个阶段。在每个阶段,APT的目标是到达与目标资源或特权相对应的特定目的地,而防御者的目标是检测APT。我们首先导出一种有效的算法,以找到两个参与者的局部最优策略。然后,我们刻画玩家双方的最佳反应,并提出算法以找到最佳反应。最后,我们使用针对ScreenGrab攻击的可改进攻击调查(RAIN)框架获得的真实攻击数据集验证我们的结果。

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