Concepts About the Capabilities of Computers and Robots: A test of the scope of adults' theory of mind

摘要

We have previously demonstrated that people apply fundamentally different concepts to mechanical agents and human agents, assuming that mechanical agents engage in more location-based, and feature-based behaviors whereas humans engage in more goal-based, and category-based behavior. We also found that attributions about anthropomorphic agents such as robots are very similar to those about computers, unless subjects are asked to attend closely to specific intentional-appearing behaviors. In the present studies, we ask whether subjects initially do not attribute intentionality to robots because they believe that temporary limits in current technology preclude real intelligent behavior. In addition, we ask whether a basic categorization as an artifact affords lessened attributions of intentionality. We find that subjects assume that robots created with future technology may become more intentional, but will not be fully equivalent to humans, and that even a fully human-controlled robot will not be as intentional as a human. These results suggest that subjects strongly distinguish intelligent agents based on intentionality, and that the basic living/mechanical distinction is powerful enough, even in adults, to make it difficult for adults to assent to the possibility that mechanical things can be fully intentional.