Does Ultimate Controlling Owners' Political Status Mitigate the Credit Banks' Dependence on the Accounting Information?--An Empirical Study Based on Chinese Private Listed Companies

摘要

This paper inspects whether the ultimate controlling owners' political status alleviates the credit banks' dependence on the accounting information of Chinese private listed companies. It finds that the ultimate controlling owners' political status mitigates the credit banks' dependence on accounting information, and the higher the level of political status, the stronger the above effects. It also finds that the politically connected firms have lower probabilities in departure from loan contract, the incidence of illegal events, and obtaining severe auditing opinions, but the firms' government and bank backgrounds do not weaken the function of accounting information, and the probabilities in departure from loan contract, the incidence of illegal events, and obtaining severe auditing opinions are not being declined by government and bank backgrounds. In summary, the substitution effect stems from the reputation of enterprises which provides potential guarantee for the loan contract, but not from the political interference on the banks' loan decisionmaking.