首页> 外文会议>International conference on systems science, management science and system dynamics >Economic Studies of Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard in Insurance Market
【24h】

Economic Studies of Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard in Insurance Market

机译:保险市场逆向选择与道德风险的经济学研究

获取原文

摘要

In insurance market, the two problems of adverse selection and moral hazard such as insurance fraud have damaged badly the normal operation and healthy development of insurance industry. The interrelation of insurance fraud and adverse selection was analyzed in the paper by applying the correlative knowledge of game theory and information economics. And it is indicated that insurance fraud will lead to the increase of insurance premium and further bring the adverse selection under the information asymmetry. At a result, the point of the problem lies in how to curtail the occurrence and development of insurance fraud. Finally the corresponding measures were advanced for preventing and punishing the insurance fraud.
机译:在保险市场中,保险诈骗等逆向选择和道德风险这两个问题严重损害了保险业的正常运作和健康发展。运用博弈论与信息经济学的相关知识,分析了保险欺诈与逆向选择之间的相互关系。结果表明,保险欺诈会导致保险费的增加,进而使逆向选择成为信息不对称的原因。结果,问题的关键在于如何减少保险欺诈的发生和发展。最后提出了相应的预防和惩处保险欺诈的措施。

著录项

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱:kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备:11010802029741号 ICP备案号:京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有
  • 客服微信

  • 服务号