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A game formulation of duopoly market with coexistence of SoftSim and regular users

机译:与SoftSim和普通用户并存的双头垄断市场的游戏公式

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The stable subscription relationships between users and Wireless Service Providers (WSPs) are established on the long-term service contracts and SIM (Subscriber Identity Module) cards. However, Apple's “Soft Sim” plan will break the subscription relationships. With SoftSim devices, users can flexibly switch WSPs at fine time scales, which provides more choices to users and benefits them. Thus more and more users will turn to SoftSim devices. But due to many challenges unsettled, it is likely that SoftSim users will coexist with regular users who are bound to certain WSPs for a long time. How to form best strategies to attract more demand, fully utilize network capacity and thus improve the revenue in the market with heterogeneous users remains a challenge for WSPs. In this paper, we address the problem of WSPs' revenue maximization in a duopoly market with the coexistence of regular and SoftSim users. We formulate the scenario as a non-cooperative two-stage game where the WSPs first announce their prices and then users decide the subscription and demand response. We derive the unique Nash Equilibrium (NE) under our framework and also give a convergence algorithm based on best response functions. The simulation results verify our theoretic conclusions.
机译:用户和无线服务提供商(WSP)之间的稳定订阅关系建立在长期服务合同和SIM(用户身份模块)卡上。但是,苹果的“ Soft Sim”计划将打破订阅关系。使用SoftSim设备,用户可以在合适的时间范围内灵活地切换WSP,这为用户提供了更多选择,并使他们受益。因此,越来越多的用户将转向SoftSim设备。但是由于尚未解决的许多挑战,SoftSim用户很可能会与长期绑定到某些WSP的普通用户共存。如何制定最佳策略来吸引更多需求,充分利用网络容量,从而提高异构用户的市场收入,仍然是WSP的挑战。在本文中,我们解决了普通用户和SoftSim用户并存的双寡头市场中WSP收益最大化的问题。我们将该方案描述为一种非合作的两阶段博弈,其中WSP首先宣布其价格,然后用户决定订阅和需求响应。我们在我们的框架下得出唯一的纳什均衡(NE),并给出了基于最佳响应函数的收敛算法。仿真结果验证了我们的理论结论。

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