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Game Behavior between Institutional and Individual Investors in Chinese Stock Market

机译:中国股票市场中机构投资者与个人投资者之间的博弈行为

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摘要

Based on KMRW reputation model proposed by Kreps, Milgrom, Roberts and Wilson(1982), in the light of the trading behavior characteristics of institutional and individual investors in Chinese stock market, this paper built a model that individual investors play game with institutions according to the observed changes of stock price. The game results show that the behavioral strategies which can achieve utility maximization are not able to be carried out by all institutional and individual investors due to special economic environment in which Chinese stock market is. Therefore, strengthening supervision and enhancing the transparency of information should be the most important tasks.
机译:基于Kreps,Milgrom,Roberts和Wilson(1982)提出的KMRW声誉模型,根据中国股票市场中机构投资者和个人投资者的交易行为特征,建立了个人投资者与机构进行博弈的模型。观察到的股价变化。博弈结果表明,由于中国股票市场所处的特殊经济环境,并非所有机构投资者和个人投资者都能够实施能够实现效用最大化的行为策略。因此,加强监管和提高信息透明度应该是最重要的任务。

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