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Contract renegotiation under asymmetric information: On the foundations of incomplete contracts.

机译:不对称信息下的合同重新谈判:关于不完全合同的基础。

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摘要

The dissertation explores the effect of limited contractual commitment on the form of contracts and studies its welfare implications. The main focus is on foundations of incomplete contracts. The thesis studies to what extent incompleteness of contracts can be linked to contract renegotiation. Particular emphasis is put onto explaining the absence of a contract from a relationship. Chapter 1 reviews the literature on contract renegotiation and incomplete contracting. Chapter 2 is based on a version of the hold-up problem. It shows that contracts that are vulnerable to renegotiation cannot provide better investment incentives than no contract. The main driving force is that investment, although beneficial from a total surplus point of view, has an ambivalent effect on the investing party's payoff. It increases the benefit of an efficient action and decreases the benefit of an inefficient action. An example is investment into human capital, such as additional job training. It increases personal satisfaction in a challenging job but may also increase the frustration from a job that consists only of repetitive tasks. If an exact job description is not feasible ex-ante and if the non-investing party has all the bargaining power ex-post, contracts cannot compensate for the cost of investment. Chapter 3 formalizes the intuition that contracting involves a cost because a contract constitutes a less flexible status quo for ex-post bargaining than no contract. For this, asymmetric information is introduced. With asymmetric information contracting is potentially costly because an inefficient outcome is not necessarily undone by an ex-post bargain. For example, during the renegotiation of the contract between General Motors and Fisher Body, the latter adopted a cost intensive production technology in order to convince its partner to renege on the former agreement. In the model of this chapter, parties weigh the benefit of a contract against lost flexibility. If these effects are similar, no contract is written. The possibility that a contract might be strictly dominated by no contract is explored in chapters 4 and 5. Such a strict dominance result is interesting because it is a more forceful advocate for the incomplete contract assumption. Chapter 4 contains a version of the durable good monopoly model with no discounting but costly contracting. These could be writing or legal costs. Early contracting is less costly than late contracting which highlights the idea that bargaining at a deadline is more costly. But also, early contracting suffers from the ratchet effect because it releases information. The main result says that the costs of the ratchet effect outweigh the cost savings, even if initial contracting costs are of order of magnitude smaller than late contracting costs. The seller strictly prefers to offer no contract. In chapter 5, a sequential screening model endogenizes the fixed contracting cost. The buyer is privately informed about one part of the good's value but ignores the second part, which is revealed later. Early contracting is beneficial because it suffers less from asymmetric information than does late contracting. Nevertheless, if uncertainty with respect to the first variable is greater than uncertainty with respect to the second variable, the seller cannot take advantage of this fact and he strictly prefers to wait. Moreover, if this is not the case, contracts are partially incomplete because they are not conditioned on the second variable. Finally, the thesis reports the new effect that all contracts are renegotiated in equilibrium. This is in contrast to the renegotiation proofness principle, which states that in models of contracting with renegotiation one can restrict attention to renegotiation proof contracts.
机译:本文探讨了有限的合同承诺对合同形式的影响,并研究了其对福利的影响。主要重点是不完整合同的基础。本文研究了合同的不完整性在多大程度上可以与合同重新谈判联系起来。特别强调解释关系中没有合同。第1章回顾了有关合同重新谈判和不完全合同的文献。第2章基于滞留问题的版本。它表明易受重新谈判影响的合同不能提供比没有合同更好的投资激励措施。主要驱动力是,尽管从总盈余的角度来看是有益的,但投资对投资方的收益产生了矛盾的影响。它增加了有效措施的收益,而降低了无效措施的收益。一个例子是对人力资本的投资,例如额外的工作培训。它提高了挑战性工作中的个人满意度,但也可能增加仅由重复性任务组成的工作的挫败感。如果事前无法提供准确的职位描述,并且如果非投资方事后拥有所有讨价还价的能力,则合同无法补偿投资成本。第三章将直觉正式化为合同涉及成本,因为与没有合同相比,合同构成的事后谈判灵活性较差。为此,引入了非对称信息。使用非对称信息合同可能会造成高昂的成本,因为事后的讨价还价不一定会抵消无效的结果。例如,在通用汽车公司与费舍尔车身公司之间的合同重新谈判期间,费舍尔车身公司采用了成本密集型生产技术,以说服其合作伙伴放弃前一份协议。在本章的模型中,各方将权衡合同的好处与失去的灵活性联系在一起。如果这些效果相似,则不写任何合同。在第4章和第5章中探讨了合同可能由没有合同严格支配的可能性。这种严格的支配结果很有趣,因为它是不完全合同假设的有力主张。第4章介绍了持久的良好垄断模型,该模型不打折但签约成本高。这些可能是书面或法律费用。提前签订合同要比迟签合同便宜,这突出了这样一个想法,即在最后期限进行讨价还价的费用更高。而且,由于提前签约会释放信息,因此会产生棘轮效应。主要结果表明,即使最初的合同成本比后期的合同成本小一个数量级,棘轮效应的成本也超过了节省的成本。卖方严格希望不提供任何合同。在第5章中,顺序筛选模型内生了固定的合同成本。买方被私下告知商品价值的一部分,但忽略了第二部分,该部分将在以后披露。尽早签约是有益的,因为与迟签约相比,它受不对称信息的影响较小。但是,如果关于第一个变量的不确定性大于关于第二个变量的不确定性,则卖方无法利用这一事实,因此,他严格希望等待。此外,如果不是这种情况,则合同部分不完整,因为它们不以第二个变量为条件。最后,论文报道了所有合同在均衡状态下重新谈判的新效果。这与重新谈判证明原则相反,后者指出,在具有重新谈判合同的模型中,可以将注意力集中在重新谈判证明合同上。

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    Reiche Sonje;

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  • 年度 2001
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