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The minimum liquidity deficit and the maturity structure of central banks' open market operations: lessons from the financial crisis

机译:最低流动性赤字和央行公开市场操作的期限结构:金融危机的教训

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摘要

This paper studies the relationship between the size of the banking sectoru2019s refinancing needs vis-ue0-vis the central bank and auction rates in its open market operations in times of financial market stress. In a theoretical model, it is found that marginal rates at central bank auctions may increase if the share of troubled banks becomes too high relative to the total size of the banking sectoru2019s refinancing needs. An empirical analysis then aims at determining the size of open market operations needed to absorb large stress levels in interbank money markets and hence contain central bank auction rates. Finally, the paper analyses effects of the composition of open market operations of different maturities on auction rates. It is found that a too high share of longer-term refinancing induces a rise in auction rates which is undesirable. Therefore, the analysis suggests that there is a lower bound for the amount of liquidity provided through short-term operations.
机译:本文研究了在金融市场压力时期,银行业相对于中央银行的再融资需求规模与公开市场操作中的拍卖利率之间的关系。在理论模型中,发现如果陷入困境的银行所占份额相对于银行部门的再融资需求总额而言过高,中央银行拍卖的边际利率可能会增加。然后,一项经验分析旨在确定公开市场操作的规模,以吸收银行间货币市场的巨大压力,从而控制央行的拍卖利率。最后,本文分析了不同期限的公开市场操作的组成对拍卖率的影响。发现长期融资的份额过高会导致拍卖率上升,这是不希望的。因此,分析表明,通过短期运营提供的流动资金数量存在下限。

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