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Controlling shareholders and payout policy: Do founding families have a special 'taste for dividends'?

机译:控制股东和支付政策:创始家庭是否有特殊的“分红味”?

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摘要

Around the world (with the U.S. and U.K. as exceptions) concentrated ownership structures and controlling shareholders are predominant even among listed firms. We provide novel empirical evidence how such controlling shareholders, in particular founding families, affect payout policy decisions. Thereby, we use a unique panel dataset of 660 listed firms in the 1995 to 2006 period from Germany, an economy that is traditionally characterized by concentrated ownership structures and strong family capitalism. We find that family firms exhibit a higher propensity and level for both dividend payments and total payouts. This result is driven by family ownership rather than family management. Conflicts between the founding family and non-family controlling shareholders and tensions within the founding family are important determinants of payout policy. While family blockholder increase the propensity for a payout to shareholders, outside blockholder have an opposing effect. Finally, we find that common action problems and conflicts among a multitude of family members and/or generations in "real family firms" lead to a higher taste for dividend payments' if compared to firms dominated by the founder ("founder-controlled firms"). Our results prove to be stable against a battery of robustness tests including a matching estimator technique to demonstrate causal effects. Overall, our paper contributes to two strands of literature: the emerging literature on family firms and the more mature literature on corporate payout policy.
机译:在全球范围内(美国和英国除外),集中的所有权结构和控股股东甚至在上市公司中也占主导地位。我们提供了新颖的经验证据,证明了这种控股股东,特别是创始家族如何影响派息政策决策。因此,我们使用了一个独特的面板数据集,该数据集包含1995年至2006年德国的660家上市公司,而德国传统上以所有权结构集中和强大的家庭资本主义为特征。我们发现,家族企业在股息支付和总支出方面都表现出更高的倾向和水平。这一结果是由家庭所有权而不是家庭管理驱动的。创始家族与非家族控股股东之间的冲突以及创始家族内部的紧张关系是支付政策的重要决定因素。尽管家族大股东增加了向股东支付的可能性,但外部大股东却有相反的效果。最后,我们发现,与创始人主导的公司(“创始人控制的公司”)相比,“真正的家族企业”中众多家庭成员和/或几代人之间的共同行动问题和冲突导致对股息支付的偏好更高。 )。我们的结果证明了对一系列鲁棒性测试的稳定性,其中包括用于证明因果关系的匹配估计器技术。总体而言,我们的论文贡献于两大类文献:有关家族企业的新兴文献和关于公司支出政策的较成熟文献。

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