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Transaction taxes and traders with heterogeneous investment horizons in an agent-based financial market model /

机译:在基于代理的金融市场模型中具有异质投资视角的交易税和交易者/

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摘要

This heterogeneous interacting agents model of a financial market is a generalization of the model proposed by Westerhoff (The Use of Agent-Based Financial Market Models to Test the Effectiveness of Regulatory Policies) by traders who are allowed to have different investment horizons as introduced by Demary (Who Does a Currency Transaction Tax Harm More: Short-term Speculators or Long-term Investors?). Our research goals are, first, to study what consequences the introduction of heterogeneous investment horizons has for agent-based financial market models and second, how effective transaction taxes are in stabilizing financial markets. In detail, we are interested in how the popularity of different trading rules and investment horizons change due to taxation and how emergent properties from the interaction of traders like bubbles and crashes, excess volatility, excess kurtosis and volatility clustering change. Numerical simulations reveal that under taxation traders abstain from short-term trading in favour of longer investment horizons. This change in behavior leads to less excess volatility and diminishing volatility clusters for small tax rates. When the tax rate exceeds a certain threshold, excess volatility and misalignments increase as also found in Westerhoff (Heterogeneous Traders and the Tobin Tax). The reason is, that the longer term fundamentalist trading rule becomes unpopular in favor of the longer term trend-chasing rule.
机译:金融市场的这种异构的交互代理模型是Westerhoff(使用基于代理的金融市场模型来测试监管政策的有效性)提出的模型的概括,交易者允许由Demary引入不同的投资范围(谁会对货币交易税造成更大的危害:短期投机者还是长期投资者?)。我们的研究目标是,首先,研究引入异类投资方式对基于代理的金融市场模型有何后果;其次,如何有效地交易税来稳定金融市场。详细地说,我们关注的是不同的交易规则和投资视野的受欢迎程度如何因税收而变化,以及交易者之间的互动所产生的新兴属性(如泡沫和崩溃,过度波动,过度峰度和波动聚类)如何变化。数值模拟表明,在征税条件下,交易者放弃短期交易,而倾向于更长的投资期限。这种行为上的改变导致较小的税率下的过度波动性和波动性集群的减少。当税率超过特定阈值时,过度波动性和错位会增加,这也在Westerhoff(异质交易者和Tobin税)中发现。原因是,长期的原教旨主义交易规则不再受长期趋势追赶规则的欢迎。

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    Demary Markus;

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  • 年度 2009
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  • 正文语种 eng
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