In 2002, the Securities and Exchange Commission mandated that the chief executive officers of large, publicly traded firms certify the accuracy of their company financial statements. In this paper, I investigate whether CEO certification has had a measurable effect on the stock market valuation of the forty-two bank holding companies subject to the SEC order. I find that these firms experienced a positive average abnormal return of 30 to 60 basis points on the day of certification - a result driven primarily by those BHCs that certified ahead of the SEC's deadline. Characteristics associated with greater opaqueness - BHC asset size, liquid asset holdings, and the extent of risky and information-intensive lending-are systematically associated with these certification day abnormal returns. In addition, average returns for not-yet-certifying BHCs were positive, though not statistically significant, on the first two certified, lending weak support to idea that early by some may have signaled investors other likely certify. Overall, results suggest requirement provided relevant information was thus an effective public policy tool, at least banking sector.
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机译:2002年,美国证券交易委员会(Securities and Exchange Commission)要求大型上市公司的首席执行官证明其公司财务报表的准确性。在本文中,我研究了CEO认证是否对受SEC指令约束的42家银行控股公司的股票市场估值产生了可衡量的影响。我发现这些公司在认证之日的平均回报率高达30至60个基点,这主要是由那些在SEC截止日期之前获得认证的BHC推动的。与更大的不透明性相关的特征-BHC资产规模,流动资产持有量以及风险和信息密集型贷款的范围-与这些认证日的异常回报系统相关。此外,尚未获得认证的BHC的平均收益在前两个获得认证的国家中为正数,尽管在统计上并不显着,这为某些人早些时候暗示投资者可能已经出具证明的想法提供了较弱的支持。总体而言,结果表明要求,前提是相关信息因此是至少银行部门有效的公共政策工具。
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