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A conceptual framework to investigate the optimisation of financial incentive mechanisms in construction projects

机译:研究建设项目财务激励机制优化的概念框架

摘要

Implementation of financial incentive mechanisms in the contractual arrangements of a construction project can impact significantly on the motivation of contractors and hence project performance. Positive incentives (as a component of the project delivery strategy) aim to motivate contractors to align their goals with those of the client, via a financial reward. udThese incentive mechanisms take many forms in construction contracts, including: profit sharing in cost plus incentive contracts, bonus performance provisions attached to various lump sum and cost reimbursable contracts, and multiple financial incentive mixes.udThe optimisation of financial incentive mechanisms depends greatly on how they are designed in the context of specific project environments. For example, if the client/contractor relationship is poor, the contractor may perceive the financial incentive as calculative and hostile, and therefore will be less committed to the client’s goals than the incentives intended.udIn order to establish a starting point for further research into this topic area, this paper outlines the results of an international review of the literature on financial incentive contract types and the factors that influence the motivation of contract agents under these arrangements. The paper then goes on to propose an analytical framework that is to be used in the evaluation of optimal financial incentive mechanisms in construction projects, drawing on economic and psychological motivational theories. The findings of this review provide a sound basis for the empirical work to follow in a PhD project investigating the optimisation of financial incentive mechanisms in the Australian commercial building industry.
机译:在建设项目的合同安排中实施财务激励机制可能会严重影响承包商的动机,进而影响项目绩效。积极奖励措施(作为项目交付策略的一部分)旨在通过经济奖励来激励承包商使其目标与客户的目标保持一致。 ud这些激励机制在建筑合同中采取多种形式,包括:成本加激励合同中的利润分享,各种一次性费用和费用可偿还合同所附的奖金绩效规定以及多种财务激励组合。 ud财务激励机制的优化在很大程度上取决于在特定项目环境中如何设计它们。例如,如果客户/承包商之间的关系不佳,承包商可能会认为财务激励是计算性和敌对性的,因此与预期的激励相比,对客户目标的承诺会更少。 ud为了建立进一步研究的起点在该主题领域中,本文概述了国际上有关财务激励合同类型以及影响这些安排下的合同代理人动机的因素的文献综述的结果。然后,本文基于经济和心理激励理论,提出了一个分析框架,该框架可用于评估建设项目的最佳财务激励机制。这次审查的结果为进行博士学位项目的经验工作提供了良好的基础,该项目研究了澳大利亚商业建筑业中财务激励机制的优化。

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  • 作者

    Rose Timothy M.; Manley Karen;

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  • 年度 2005
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  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 {"code":"en","name":"English","id":9}
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