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Patient cost sharing - reforms without evidence : theoretical considerations and empirical findings from industrialized countries

机译:患者费用分摊-无证据的改革:工业化国家的理论考虑和经验发现

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摘要

"International health service research reveals a uniform tendency in practically all industrialised countries: an increasing shift of costs from solidarity-based financing to private households. Legislators and advisors usually justify this policy through the need to encourage cost-consciousness and especially 'individual responsibility'. Economists consider cost-sharing in health care to be necessary to prevent abuse of the welfare state. They expect user charges and co-payments to motivate a more 'rational' utilisation of health care and, thus, the financial stabilisation of health systems. Many politicians and economists base their assumptions about the 'health market' on the theorem of demand-side moral hazard. This model transforms patients into rational 'utility maximisers' consuming services beyond their needs thereby causing welfare losses to society as a whole. Moral hazard in health insurance belongs to the standard repertoires of economic textbooks. The present study analyses the extensive theoretical and empirical literature on patient cost-sharing published during the last forty years. The results show that persuasive evidence for demand-side moral hazard is still lacking. Furthermore, the claimed empiricism turns out to be inappropriate for providing evidence. Science health service research and clinical studies instead suggest that health insurance beneficiaries are not aiming to abuse the health system. In fact, introducing patient cost-sharing seems to endanger proper health care since it deters the sick from claiming benefits. The idea of 'rational' use transpires to be out of touch with reality. After a systematic in-depth review of current research on the topic, the author concludes that moral hazard in health insurance is a bogey of academic economic theory. Adequate reality-based evidence for implementing patient user fees and co-payments is lacking. In view of the detrimental effects on health service utilisation, he advises cancelling existing co-payment arrangements and abandoning cost-sharing policies." (author's abstract)
机译:“国际卫生服务研究揭示了几乎所有工业化国家的统一趋势:成本从基于团结的筹资向私人家庭的转移越来越多。立法者和顾问通常通过鼓励成本意识尤其是“个人责任”来证明这一政策的合理性。经济学家认为,为防止滥用福利国家,必须分担医疗保健费用,他们期望使用者付费和共同付款可以促使人们更加“合理”地利用医疗保健,从而促进医疗体系的财务稳定。许多政治家和经济学家基于需求方道德风险定理对“健康市场”进行假设,这种模式将患者转变为超出其需求的理性“效用最大化”消费服务,从而给整个社会带来福利损失。健康保险中的经济学属于经济教科书的标准目录。最近40年来发表的有关患者费用分摊的广泛理论和经验文献。结果表明,仍缺乏有说服力的需求侧道德风险证据。此外,所主张的经验主义被证明不适合提供证据。相反,科学健康服务研究和临床研究表明,健康保险受益人并非旨在滥用卫生系统。实际上,引入患者分担费用似乎会危害适当的医疗保健,因为这会阻止病人申请福利。 “理性的”使用想法与现实脱节。在对当前关于该主题的研究进行系统深入的审查后,作者得出结论,健康保险中的道德风险是学术经济学理论的忌口。缺乏足够的基于事实的证据来实施患者用户费用和共付额。考虑到对卫生服务利用的不利影响,他建议取消现有的自付费用安排并放弃费用分担政策。”(作者摘要)

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    Holst Jens;

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