O conceito de liberdadeem o ser e o nada de Jean-Paul Sartre

摘要

This dissertation aims to address the concept of freedom from the perspective of the Frenchphilosopher Jean-Paul Sartre with reference to the main work Being and Nothingness. Afterpresenting the concept of freedom we will try to show that it is related to the notion ofresponsibility, which will lead, ultimately, to define the Sartrean philosophy as a philosophy ofaction. In the first chapter we will present in passing the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl,philosopher from which Sartre will develop his concept of freedom. The Husserlian notion ofconsciousness (intentionality) is the way to develop his analysis of Sartre phenomenon of being.From this analysis Sartre submits their concepts of being in-itself and being for-itself. Being initselfis defined as the things of the world devoid of consciousness, are the things that surround us.The In-itself has as its main brand positivity: it is what it is, is all that can be said about him. In turnbeing For-itself is the very being of man, which differs radically from the In-itself. The For-itselfhas as its main intentionality, ie, its ability to project outside itself in existence. That's when Sartreshows that this type of being realizes its existence on the basis of a constant nihilation. Here comesthe notion of anything. Among the relations of the For-itself with the surrounding world stands avery special: relationship between consciousnesses. It is when we discuss the issue of another.Intersubjectivity, through sartrean analysis of look, show that the For-itself assumes a newexistential dimension: the being-for others. That's when Sartre will emphasize his notion ofconflict. The conflict in intersubjectivity would come from the fact that you want to take another-For-itself as an object. Given this we will analyze what Sartre called the concrete relations withothers. The philosopher submit such relations in the form of ducts and conduits assimilation ofownership. In the first my-self to try to "get lost" in the consciousness of another, ownership of myconduct in-itself tries to "take ownership" of the subjectivity of the other and try to treat others asthings, as objects. In this sense Sartre examines the experiences of love, masochism, indifference,desire and sadism. Following this route we will enter the land of freedom itself, which is the majortheme of our work. Since Sartre defines the For-itself as a being that is projected to create your wayof being, it can only define it as freedom. The freedom of the For-itself is taken in terms ofautonomy of choice. Once the For-itself has no way of being a thing as being in-itself, it just maybe picking up, that is, making your being. Here Sartre speaks of the anguish that would be thesymptom of freedom itself. The fact that the For-itself have to choose on whether the call as onebeing distressed. However, in most cases the For-itself tries to escape from the anguish of freedomand takes refuge in bad faith. After setting the man (For-itself) as freedom Sartre defends that he istotally responsible for what he does of himself. Once the philosopher holds that man is notpredetermined, ie, does not have an a priori essence, his philosophy has as its basic assumption theaction. If Sartre argues that the For-itself must constantly choose your way of being, the action isthe basis on which man will exercise his own freedom. In this sense we conclude the work with anapproach to work Existentialism is a Humanism, which represent the entry of the philosopher onthe practical aspects of life