Throughout the vast majority of its history, hedonism about well-being has been perennially unpopular (Feldman 2004). The arguments in this essay take steps towards reviving the plausibility of hedonism about well-being. The main argumentcurrently used to refute hedonism about well-being, the Argument from False Pleasures, is shown to lack sufficient evidence to be compelling. The main evidence provided for the Argument from False Pleasures comes in the form of two thought experiments, the Experience Machine (Nozick 1974) and the Deceived Businessman (Kagan 1998). These thought experiments typically produce strong intuitiveresponses, which are used to directly support the Argument from False Pleasures. This essay investigates how theories of well-being are currently evaluated by moral philosophers, with a specific focus on the place our intuitions have in the process. Indeed, the major role that moral intuitions play in evaluating theories of well-being,despite their sometimes dubious epistemic credentials, leads to an in-depth enquiryinto their inner workings and potential for containing normatively significant information. The investigation, which draws on the work of Woodward and Allman (2007), concludes that intuitions about unrealistic thought experiments should not play an important role in evaluating theories of well-being. Rather, they should onlyact as a warning sign, highlighting moral propositions for further analysis. Based on these findings, a new method for assessing theories of well-being is suggested and applied to a specific internalist account of hedonism about well-being to show how the Deceived Businessman and Experience Machine thought experiments lacknormative significance, leaving the Argument from False Pleasures without sufficient evidence to be compelling. Indeed, this essay concludes that the Argument from False Pleasures should no longer be thought to provide any good reason to believe that hedonism about well-being is implausible. This result is only one step on theroad to reviving hedonism about well-being, but it is a very important one.
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机译：纵观其历史上的绝大多数，享乐主义一直不受欢迎（Feldman 2004）。本文中的论点为恢复享乐主义对幸福感的合理性采取了步骤。当前被用来反驳享乐主义的主要论点-《来自假快乐的争论》，被证明缺乏足够的令人信服的证据。虚假乐趣论证提供的主要证据来自两个思想实验的形式：体验机器（Nozick 1974）和受骗商人（Kagan 1998）。这些思想实验通常会产生强烈的直观反应，这些反应可直接用于支持“错误愉悦”的论点。本文探讨了道德哲学家当前如何评价幸福理论，特别关注了直觉在过程中所处的位置。确实，道德直觉在评估幸福理论中起着主要作用，尽管它们有时具有可疑的认识论依据，却导致人们对其内在行为和包含规范性重要信息的潜力进行了深入研究。该调查借鉴了伍德沃德和奥尔曼（Woodward and Allman，2007）的研究，得出的结论是，关于不切实际的思想实验的直觉不应在评估幸福感理论中发挥重要作用。相反，它们仅应作为警告信号，突出道德主张以供进一步分析。基于这些发现，提出了一种评估幸福感理论的新方法，并将其应用于关于幸福感的享乐主义的特定内在论解，以表明“欺骗商人”和“体验机器”思想实验如何缺乏规范意义，从而使论点不再是错误的。没有足够的令人信服的证据。的确，本文得出的结论是，不应再将《错误快乐论证》认为是提供充分的理由相信享乐主义是不合理的。这一结果只是恢复享乐主义享乐之路的一步，但这是非常重要的一步。
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