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Mobile Termination Charges: Calling Party Pays versus Receiving Party Pays

机译:移动终端收费:主叫方付款与接收方付款

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摘要

There has been widespread concern at the level of mobile termination charges, leading to increasingly severe price controls. Oftel and the Competition Commission identified the Caller Pays Principle (CPP) as the source of the market power that enabled termination charges to be set above cost. Both accepted that the alternative Receiver Pays Principle (RPP) would solve the monopoly problem, but rejected it primarily because RPP might lead to significant numbers of users switching off their mobile phones. Evidence from RPP countries is consistent with RPP solving market power problems. CPP is almost certainly less efficient than RPP. US and other evidence suggests that the argument about customers switching off phones is not tenable. If the aim is efficient resource allocation, undistorted by excessive termination charges and subsidised handsets, to be achieved by competition rather than price controls, then RPP is preferable to CPP.
机译:移动终端收费水平引起了广泛的关注,导致价格控制越来越严格。 Oftel和竞争委员会确定了呼叫方付费原则(CPP)是市场支配力的源泉,可以将终止费定为高于成本。双方都接受替代的接收者付费原则(RPP)将解决垄断问题,但主要是因为RPP可能导致大量用户关闭手机而拒绝了它。 RPP国家的证据与RPP解决市场力量问题是一致的。 CPP几乎肯定比RPP效率低。美国和其他证据表明,有关客户关闭电话的说法是站不住脚的。如果目标是通过竞争而不是价格控制来实现有效的资源分配,而不会因过多的终止费用和受补贴的手机而扭曲,那么RPP优于CPP。

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  • 作者

    Littlechild Stephen C.;

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  • 年度 2004
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  • 正文语种 en_GB
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