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Selfish Misbehavior in 802.11 Wireless Networks

机译:802.11无线网络中的自私行为

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摘要

Media access protocols in wireless networks require each contending node to wait for a backoff time chosen randomly from a given range, before attempting to transmit on a shared channel. However, selfish stations might try to acquire an unfair portion of the channel resources, at the expense of the cooperating nodes, by not following the protocol specifications. For example, they might choose smaller backoff values more often than would be dictated by pure chance. In this thesis, we study how to detect such misbehavior as well as how nodes might be induced to adhere to the protocol. ududWe first introduce a game-theoretic framework that models an abstracted version of the medium access protocol as a strategic static game. We are interested in designing a game which exhibits a unique Nash equilibrium corresponding to a pre-specified full-support distribution profile. In the cooperation inducement context, the Nash equilibrium for the game would correspond to protocol compliance on behalf of the participating nodes. We identify an exact condition on the number of players and the number of their strategies that must be met to guarantee the existence of such a game. ududFurther, we propose a new protocol called XVBEB in order to determine based on the stations' backoff values choices whether they are behaving accordingly or selfishly. We describe how to deduce the backoff values in XVBEB based on observations of transmissions by nodes in the network and the collision timeline, which is rarely feasible with the IEEE 802.11 backoff procedure. Given a set of backoff values used by an XVBEB node, we describe how to conclude with a specified level of certainty whether the node is indeed adhering to the protocol. ududFinally, we evaluate the performance of a network of XVBEB nodes and compare it against a standard IEEE 802.11 network. Simulation results show that the throughput of XVBEB is better than that of 802.11 for saturated CBR traffic. Furthermore, XVBEB also exhibits lower packet loss, delay and delay variation than 802.11 for both VBR and VoIP traffic for a variety of load conditions.
机译:无线网络中的媒体访问协议要求每个竞争节点等待从给定范围中随机选择的退避时间,然后再尝试在共享信道上进行传输。但是,自私的站点可能会尝试通过不遵循协议规范而以协作节点为代价获取不公平的信道资源部分。例如,他们可能会比纯粹的偶然机会更频繁地选择较小的退避值。在本文中,我们研究如何检测这种不当行为以及如何诱导节点遵守协议。 ud ud我们首先介绍了一种博弈论框架,该模型将媒体访问协议的抽象版本建模为战略静态博弈。我们感兴趣的是设计一种游戏,该游戏展现出与预先指定的全面支持分配状况相对应的唯一纳什均衡。在合作诱导上下文中,游戏的纳什均衡将代表参与节点对应于协议合规性。我们确定了玩家数量及其策略数量的确切条件,以保证此类游戏的存在。 ud ud此外,我们提出了一种称为XVBEB的新协议,以便根据站点的退避值选择来确定它们的行为是相应的还是自私的。我们描述了如何根据网络中节点和冲突时间轴对传输的观察来推导XVBEB中的退避值,这在IEEE 802.11退避过程中几乎是不可行的。给定XVBEB节点使用的一组退避值,我们描述如何以指定的确定性级别得出结论,该节点是否确实遵守该协议。最后,我们评估XVBEB节点网络的性能,并将其与标准IEEE 802.11网络进行比较。仿真结果表明,对于饱和的CBR流量,XVBEB的吞吐量优于802.11。此外,对于各种负载情况,对于VBR和VoIP流量,XVBEB还表现出比802.11低的数据包丢失,延迟和延迟变化。

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    Ganchev Antoniy;

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  • 年度 2011
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