首页> 外文OA文献 >Influence of Non-harmonized Capacity Remuneration Mechanisms in an Interconnected Power System on Generation Adequacy
【2h】

Influence of Non-harmonized Capacity Remuneration Mechanisms in an Interconnected Power System on Generation Adequacy

机译:互联电力系统中容量补偿机制不统一对发电充足性的影响

代理获取
本网站仅为用户提供外文OA文献查询和代理获取服务,本网站没有原文。下单后我们将采用程序或人工为您竭诚获取高质量的原文,但由于OA文献来源多样且变更频繁,仍可能出现获取不到、文献不完整或与标题不符等情况,如果获取不到我们将提供退款服务。请知悉。

摘要

Insufficient incentives from the market lead to threats to generation adequacy. In order to create more steady investment signals, capacity mechanisms (CMs) are discussed in many European countries. CMs are discussed to complement energy-based market designs and ensure long-term generation adequacy. The introduction of a CM has an impact, both in the implementing but also in interconnected neighbouring countries. Hereby, the participation of non-domestic capacity at the CM through interconnection to enhance generation adequacy is often only limited or not at all possible. Current discussion is mostly based on qualitative studies. The possible joint impacts are discussed applying economic theory and transferred experience from world-wide implementations. This paper introduces an equilibrium model that allows for quantitative studies directly aiming on the possible interaction on interconnected countries with no, different or equal market designs including CMs. Changing market settings and increasing interconnection capacities can be researched to underpin the qualitative discussion. The cross-border effects are studied that arise if harmonization of CM or cross-border participation are neglected. A case study simulates two interconnected countries in a symmetrical set up to trace down the changes in the results to changes of market design and interconnection capacity. Results show that the change of market design in neighbouring countries has a strong impact on domestic generation adequacy. Increased interconnection capacity can have counter-intuitive effects on the overall generation adequacy.
机译:市场激励措施不足会威胁到发电的充足性。为了创建更稳定的投资信号,许多欧洲国家都讨论了产能机制(CM)。讨论了CM,以补充基于能源的市场设计并确保长期发电的充足性。引入CM不仅对实施国家而且对相互联系的邻国都有影响。因此,通过互连以提高发电充足性而在CM上参与非住宅生产的能力通常仅受到限制,或者根本不可能。当前的讨论主要基于定性研究。应用经济理论讨论了可能的共同影响,并从世界范围的实施中汲取了经验。本文介绍了一种均衡模型,该模型允许进行定量研究,直接针对没有,没有不同或平等市场设计(包括CM)的互连国家之间的可能相互作用。可以研究变化的市场环境和增加的互连能力,以支持定性讨论。如果忽略CM的协调或跨界参与,就会产生跨界效应。案例研究以对称设置模拟了两个相互联系的国家,以追踪结果的变化,以适应市场设计和互连能力的变化。结果表明,邻国市场设计的变化对国内发电的充足性有很大影响。互连能力的提高可能会对总体发电量的充足性产生反直觉的影响。

著录项

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
代理获取

客服邮箱:kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备:11010802029741号 ICP备案号:京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有
  • 客服微信

  • 服务号