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Tax policies, vintage capital, and exit and entry of plants

机译:税收政策,老式资本以及工厂的进出

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摘要

Following Chamley, Lucas, Laitner, and Aiyagari, this dissertation continues toexplore the answer for the question of zero capital taxation by discussing how taxeson capital income, labor income, and property affect the economy in the contextof a vintage capital model where the embodied technology grows exogenously. Thegovernment maximizes social welfare by finding the optimal combinations of the threetax rates in the steady state and examines the welfare gain/loss over and after thetransitions caused by different types of shocks. The simulation method used here islinear approximation.My results show that in the steady-state economy, given a fixed level of gov-ernment expenditure and a zero property tax rate, the capital-income tax rate thatmaximizes steady-state utility may be negative, zero, or positive depending on thelevel of government expenditure. I also find that, for many values of governmentspending, the highest level of steady-state utility occurs with a subsidy to capitalincome and a tax on labor income. Finally, I find that when taxes on capital income,labor income, and property are available, capital-income taxes are generally the lastresort to finance government expenditures.My results show that in the transitional economy, when tax rates are perma-nently changed and the government expenditure is near zero, the loss of utility overthe transition from no taxes to capital subsidies is too large so the idea itself is notutility-enhancing. Secondly, I find that when the government expenditure is low anda positive technology shock occurs, social welfare in the economy without capital-income taxes may perform better in the early phase of the transition but worse in thelater phase of the transition than that in the economy without property taxes. How-ever, the situation becomes the opposite as government expenditures increase. Inaddition, when one tax is allowed to change, a changing labor-income tax may bringmore utility over the transition than the other two taxes. Finally, when the govern-ment expenditure is unexpectedly reduced, I find that using property taxes ratherthan capital-income taxes stimulates consumption and employment more given ahigher initial level of government expenditure.
机译:继Chamley,Lucas,Laitner和Aiyagari之后,本文继续讨论零资本税问题的答案,方法是讨论在老式资本模型中体现技术发展的背景下,资本收入,劳动收入和财产税对经济的影响外生地。政府通过找到稳态下三种税率的最佳组合来最大化社会福利,并检查由不同类型的冲击导致的过渡前后的福利收益/损失。我的研究结果表明,在稳态经济中,在固定的政府支出水平和零财产税率的情况下,最大化稳态效用的资本收入税率可能为负,零或正,具体取决于政府支出的水平。我还发现,对于许多悬而未决的政府价值观而言,最高水平的稳态效用是对资本收入的补贴和对劳动收入的税收。最后,我发现,当可以获得资本收入,劳动收入和财产税时,资本收入税通常是为政府支出提供资金的最后手段。我的结果表明,在转轨经济中,税率永久改变,政府支出几乎为零,在从无税过渡到资本补贴的过程中,效用的损失太大,因此这个想法本身并不是在提高效用。其次,我发现,当政府支出较低且发生积极的技术冲击时,在没有资本所得税的情况下,经济中的社会福利在过渡初期可能会比在经济中表现更好,但在过渡后期却表现不佳。没有财产税。但是,随着政府支出的增加,情况就相反了。另外,当一种税被允许改变时,变化的劳动收入税可能比其他两种税带来更多的效用。最后,当政府支出意外减少时,我发现,使用较高的初始政府支出水平,使用财产税而不是资本收入税会刺激消费和就业。

著录项

  • 作者

    Chang Shao-Jung;

  • 作者单位
  • 年度 2006
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  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 en_US
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