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The Cost of Equity of Network Operators – Empirical Evidence and Regulatory Practice

机译:网络运营商公平的成本 - 经验证据和监管实践

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摘要

In many European countries, the deregulation of energy markets leading to the introduction of unbundling and incentive regulation for utilities firms has made the task of setting an adequate cost of equity more difficult. Firstly, Legal Unbundling led to the creation of many legally independent network operators that have to be regulated separately, excluding the generation or sales activities of mother firms. Identifying adequate costs of capital is thereby complicated by the fact that only very few network operators are traded on stock exchanges. Secondly, the increased pressure through incentive regulation schemes has reinforced the importance of setting the equity return adequately. The approaches chosen by regulatory agencies have often been accompanied by heavy criticism regarding methodology and empirical data sets used. In this context the question arises, how regulators set equity returns for network operators and whether the methodologies applied are in line with state-of-the-art capital market models. This paper therefore starts by providing an overview on empirical results, reviewing major published studies of betas and equity returns regarding utilities and network operators. This research helps to identify and discuss the most important drivers of capital costs which is an indispensable groundwork for determining adequate betas. Additionally, an overview of the current practice of regulatory equity return setting is provided. These results are then compared to an empirical analysis based on a recent data set with more than 20 network operators. Based on this data set the required equity returns according to different methodologies (CAPM, Fama-French-TFM, Ross-APT) are computed. This provides evidence that regulatory practice in Europe and Australia ignores the Fama-French-TFM or the APT, even though notably the Fama-French TFM shows the potential to provide improved estimates of required equity returns. The paper concludes by providing a suggestion on how to put the FF TFM into practice accounting for the size of non-stock listed network operators.
机译:在许多欧洲国家,能源市场的放松管制导致对公用事业公司实行分拆和激励性监管,这使得设定适当的股权成本的任务变得更加困难。首先,法律捆绑带来了许多法律上独立的网络运营商的创建,这些运营商必须单独监管,但母公司的生产或销售活动除外。由于只有很少的网络运营商在证券交易所进行交易,因此确定足够的资本成本就变得很复杂。其次,通过激励性监管计划增加的压力增强了充分设定股权收益的重要性。监管机构选择的方法通常伴随着对使用的方法和经验数据集的严厉批评。在这种情况下,出现了一个问题,即监管机构如何为网络运营商设定股权收益,以及所采用的方法是否符合最新的资本市场模型。因此,本文首先概述了经验结果,回顾了有关公用事业和网络运营商的beta和权益收益率的主要公开研究。这项研究有助于确定和讨论最重要的资本成本驱动因素,这是确定适当的beta必不可少的基础。此外,还概述了监管股本收益设置的当前做法。然后将这些结果与基于20多个网络运营商的最新数据集进行的经验分析进行比较。基于此数据集,根据不同的方法(CAPM,Fama-French-TFM,Ross-APT)计算所需的股本回报率。这提供了证据,证明欧洲和澳大利亚的监管惯例忽略了Fama-French-TFM或APT,尽管值得注意的是Fama-French TFM显示了提供所需股本收益估计的改进的潜力。本文最后提出了一个建议,即如何考虑到非股票上市网络运营商的规模而将FF TFM付诸实践。

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