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THE COST OF EQUITY OF NETWORK OPERATORS - EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE AND REGULATORY PRACTICE

机译:网络运营商的股本成本-经验证据和监管实践

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摘要

In many European countries, the deregulation of energy markets made the task of setting an adequate cost of equity more difficult. The question arises, how regulators set equity returns for network operators and whether the methodologies applied are in line with state-of-the-art capital market models. Based on an analysis of empirical results published and an own data set of more than 20 network operators, we show that most regulatory agencies do not set interest rates in an optimal way. Firstly, they either include companies with other systematic risk (e.g. integrated utilities) in their datasets. Secondly, they rely solely on CAPM even if the use of a size factor can potentially increase quality of results. 'The article concludes by providing a suggestion on how to put the FF TFM into practice accounting for the size of non-stock listed network operators.
机译:在许多欧洲国家,对能源市场的放松管制使得设定适当的股权成本变得更加困难。随之而来的问题是,监管机构如何为网络运营商设定股权收益,以及所采用的方法是否符合最新的资本市场模型。基于对已发布的经验结果的分析以及拥有20多个网络运营商的数据集,我们表明,大多数监管机构并未以最佳方式设定利率。首先,它们要么在数据集中包括具有其他系统风险(例如综合公用事业)的公司。其次,即使使用大小因子可以潜在地提高结果质量,它们也完全依靠CAPM。文章的最后提出了一个建议,即如何考虑到非股票上市网络运营商的规模,将FF TFM付诸实践。

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