A THEORY OF AMBIGUOUS PROPERTY RIGHTSrnIN TRANSITIONAL ECONOMIESrnJuly, 1995

摘要

Contrary to conventional wisdom, we &k: can ambiguous property rights sometimesrnbe efficient? Ambiguous property rights, as defined in this paper, arises whenrnowners’ rights are not guaranteed before hand. Instead, owners have to fight forrnthe actual control, ex post. As a major example of ambiguous property rights, thernhighly successful Chinese non-state sector is surveyed. The paper then rationalizesrnthe arrangement of ambiguous property rights. The key is to relate a firm’s optimalrnproperty rights arrangement to its market environment. We finally argue thatrnthe irmmhu-e market ewiroumeut iu Cl&m (the gray market) ~nmkea auhiguousrnproperty rights often more efficient than unambiguously defined private propertyrnrights.