Control and Protection System Conceptual Design Logic Diagrams for Neutron Source Facility at the Kharkov Institute of Physics and Technology, Nuclear Engineering Division

摘要

Argonne National Laboratory (ANL) in the United States and the Kharkov Institute of Physics and Technology in Ukraine are collaborating on the design development of an experimental neutron source facility. It is an accelerator driven system that utilizes a subcritical assembly driven by an electron accelerator. This facility will be used to conduct basic and applied nuclear research, produce medical isotopes, and train young nuclear specialists. Instrumentation systems are used to monitor various process and environmental parameters throughout the neutron source facility. That information is displayed to the operator or is transmitted to the appropriate plant control systems (PCS) during normal plant operation. This information is also transmitted to the plant protection system (PPS) alarms and trips and to the engineered safety-feature systems during off-normal and accident conditions. Severe-accident management is precluded except for evacuation alarms and confinement isolation. This report presents a conceptual design of the various facility instrumentation and control systems that are related through function performance requirements, design bases, and system descriptions. The primary purpose of the instrumentation and control systems is to exercise proper control and provide automatic protection against unsafe and improper facility operation during steady-state and transient operation and to initiate signals to mitigate the consequences of faulted conditions. The information presented in this report emphasizes those instrumentation and control systems that are important to ensuring that the subcritical assembly can be operated without undue risk to the health and safety of the public. As opposed to the analog systems of the past, this will be an all-digital system. Redundancy will be provided so that neither the single failure of any active component nor the single failure of any passive component will result in a loss of the capability of the system to perform its safety functions. This is referred to as the single failure criterion.