Anwar Sadat and the October War: The Strategy and Statecraft of a Twentieth Century Pharaoh.

摘要

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the strategy and statecraft of Anwar Sadat with respect to the October 1973 war with Israel. Sadat's strategy is examined using a classical approach to grand strategy. First, the author discusses the international environment that Sadat faced in 1972 and 1973. Second, he examines the international, domestic, and psychological determinants of power that affected Sadat's strategic thinking. Third, he speculates on how Sadat may have analyzed Egypt's national interests and threats to its national interests, and how he may have selected the objectives he used in formulating his grand strategy. Fourth, he looks at the execution of Sadat's strategy using the traditional tools of statecraft. And finally, he assesses Sadat's overall performance as a grand strategist.