Effects of Exclusive Teaming Arrangements on the Department of Defense Acquisition Process

摘要

The objective of this research is to assess the effects of the formation of exclusive teaming arrangements in industry on the Department of Defense (DoD) acquisition process. The data for this research were gathered by interviewing DoD and industry procurement officials and through written survey responses from DoD and industry. The thesis provides background of the policies and regulations that influence and control exclusive teaming arrangements. Additionally, this study examines the tension between competition and best value procurement policies and how they relate to the formation of exclusive teaming arrangements. The study identified the concerns, benefits and risks associated with exclusive teaming arrangements. Methods used for mitigation of these risks were also examined. The thesis concludes that exclusive teaming arrangements allow the defense industry to share the risks and the cost of capital associated with major defense programs. Furthermore, DoD must conduct extensive market research to ensure that competition in the Defense Industrial Base is maintained and the requirements of the end user are fulfilled.