Two Hands On The Sword: A Study of Political - Military Relations in National Security Policy

摘要

This paper examines US civil-military relations in order to ascertain the role that senior military leaders should play in assisting civilians to formulate national security policy. What is the military's role in the policy process, has it changed over time, and is it effective. Is the current civil-military relationship functional and durable enough to meet the challenges of the 21st Century. We explore these underlying questions for a variety of reasons. First, civilian control over the US military quite appropriately makes civilian leaders-not admirals or generals-responsible for security policy. Yet, if sensible policy truly is the 'art of the possible', then providing civilian leaders with sound military advice is the first step to the prudent use of military forces to achieve political objectives. Simply stated, the level and quality of military advice proffered has enormous consequences. Second, the emergence of new security threats in the post-Cold War era has resulted in the frequent, non-traditional employment of the US military around the globe. This has increased interest in whether civilian leaders adequately receive and evaluate military advice before opting to send forces in harm's way. In fact, the American public is unforgiving when it comes to military failure and high casualties. Politics alone makes it imprudent for civilian leaders to be perceived as formulating security policy in isolation from those who are likely to be charged with carrying it out.