Anwar Sadat's National Security Strategy in the October War: From Vision to Victory.

摘要

In the October 1973 war with Israel, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat successfully used Egypt's available means to achieve national ends by conducting a limited military campaign designed to secure limited political objectives. His national strategy revolved around three political objectives: recapturing Egyptian honor in the wake of the humiliating defeat to the Israelis in the 1967 Six-Day War, regaining Egyptian territory in the Sinai and Gaza lost in the Six-Day War, and proving that Israel was not invincible. His supporting military objectives were to inflict heavy casualties on the enemy, attack across the Suez to regain control of the canal, and recapture as much occupied territory as possible. That a state would obtain its foreign policy objectives through force and statesmanship is not unique, but what is distinctive in this instance was Sadat's ability to accomplish his objectives while at a considerable disadvantage in both military and political power in relation to his adversary, the Israelis, and while operating in a constrained bipolar international environment. Sadat's ability to develop a military plan to break the political stalemate with Israel was a result of carefully crafting specific political objectives and deliberately translating them into clear and feasible military objectives that accomplished his ends.