U.S. Missile Defenses: Three Scenarios and Their International Consequences; Journal article

摘要

The United States is building missile defenses that will offer some protection against ballistic missile warheads launched against North America. The decision to deploy a modest national missile defense has already been made - - it was signed into law in 1999. At that time, President William Clinton announced that implementing this decision would depend on an assessment of the nature of the threat, the technological capabilities of the system, its cost, and the impact on relations with allies and potential adversaries. While the goals of these limited defenses are modest, the U.S. effort to deploy a national or global missile defense system constitutes a major departure in U.S. defense strategy and may lead to unforeseen and, in some instances, unwelcome international political consequences. Since the United States and the Soviet Union signed the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty on 26 May 1972, Americans have relied on the threat of nuclear retaliation to deter missile attacks against the United States. Faced with emerging threats produced by the proliferation of long-range ballistic missiles that can be armed with WMD warheads, however, the idea of supplementing deterrence by using active defenses to destroy incoming warheads is gaining domestic political support within the United States. To take a fresh look at the missile defense issue, the authors assumed the United States will deploy missile defenses and has either modified or abandoned the ABM Treaty. They then explored the consequences of three missile deployment and treaty options. The deployment options differ in terms of the number of incoming warheads they can destroy, their ability to defend U.S. territory regardless of the direction of the incoming attack, where interceptors are deployed, their impact on existing strategic relationships, and the international political climate in which they are deployed.