Ten Years Post Desert Storm: Has Assault Support Learned the Lessons of Task Force X-Ray.

摘要

On 24 February 1991, the First Marine Expeditionary Force penetrated Iraqi defenses to begin the ground assault of Desert Storm. Task Force X-ray, a helicopter-borne force comprised of the Marines of 1st Battalion 3rd Marines, was issued an order to establish a blocking position in the vicinity of Al Burqan oil field in order to protect the First Marine Division's right flank. Essentially unprepared, unrehearsed and without appropriate leadership, the airborne assault took place with less than favorable results. This could have been the largest Marine helicopter-borne force inserted into hostile territory since the Vietnam War. Unfortunately, the mission turned out to be a terrifying flight of near mid-air collisions and chaos over the skies of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Although many factors contributed to the ineffectiveness of this mission, the essential element that stands out most is the lack of training our forces and leaders receive in large-scale helicopter-borne operations, and the indifference Commanders have towards leading them. In time of war, the Marine Expeditionary Brigade is the minimum force expected to conduct forcible entry operations. Ultimately, this can only be realized if the senior leadership recognizes the importance of the mission, presses forward with necessary training required to execute such a demanding task, and more importantly steps up to the challenge of commanding the assault.