Greek Military Strategy: The Doctrine of Deterrence and Its Implications on Greek-Turish Relations

摘要

The invasion of Cyprus by Turkey in 1974 and the occupation of 37 percent of its territory proved to be a benchmark year for Greek-Turkish relations. Since then, new frictional issues have generated in the region, making the prospects for reconciliation harder and an all out confrontation more likely. Greek policy-makers and officials believe that Turkey has adopted an expansionist and revisionist policy over the last 25 years with the aim to alter the status quo in the region. To counter this threat, Greece is trying to build up those elements in its military doctrine and defense posture that will fulfill its security concerns. The recent dynamics of Greek-Turkish interaction are driven by the central factor of the growing Turkish military advantage, which makes an escalation towards warfare, even if unintended, more likely. External factors, namely the U.S., NATO, and EU, that can contribute toward a de- escalatory direction, are not effective enough to guarantee the prevention of an all out confrontation in the foreseeable future. This thesis maintains that Greece's deterrence doctrine presents, under certain conditions, a unilateral effort that may provide an additional source of stability in addition to third party mediations. It concludes that the risk of warfare will remain significant between the two countries, unless Greece succeeds to restore the strategic balance with Turkey.