Evaluation of the Effectiveness of a Deliberately Ambiguous Nuclear Deterrent Strategy Against Chemical and Biological Weapons

摘要

Current US deterrent strategy against state-sanctioned use of chemical and biological weapons (CBW) is based upon a deliberately vague threat to retaliate with nuclear weapons. This policy has been criticized as a potentially ineffective policy. Some see a nuclear retaliatory threat as incredibly disproportionate to the CBW threat. Public statements of US leaders renouncing their intention to use nuclear weapons also undermine the credibility of the deterrent. The study analyzed the effectiveness of current strategy from three distinct angles. First, it appraised the ability of the current deterrent to cover the wide range of deterrent roles. Second, it analyzed the congruence of current deterrent strategy with six time-tested fundamental tenets of nuclear deterrence. Finally, the study used three models of decision-making to evaluate the effectiveness of this strategy. The overall assessment of the current CBW deterrent strategy is positive. There is little to suggest that a nuclear deterrent of CBW is unworkable. Current strategy also conforms to the fundamentals of deterrent theory. Finally, a comparison of current strategy with normative models of decision-making reveals no serious defect.