From Anticipatory Counterattack to Anticipatory Self-Defense - The Past, Present and Future of Preemption

摘要

Statements by the current United States administration and its September 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States of America reflect that containment and deterrence are no longer considered reliable strategic options for United States security because they fail to counter the use of weapons of mass destruction by rogue states and terrorist groups. In place of containment and deterrence, the administration identified a policy of preemption as a strategic alternative for responding to and countering such threats. Shifting from a policy of containment and deterrence to a policy of preemption presents issues, concerns, and second order effects a state must take into account before preemptively striking other nation states or their non-state allies in today's international environment. This research paper explores these issues, concerns, and effects through an examination of the concept of preemption. It begins by defining preemption in general terms through the works of selected authors, international law, and the Charter of the United Nations. To further assist in understanding preemption as a strategic security strategy, the paper looks at selected historical examples where preemption was used or considered for use in differing environments as a security strategy. It then provides a comprehensive definition of preemption and discusses hidden consequences associated with a policy or employment of preemptive force. This text closes with thoughts relative to the future of preemption as a national security strategy for the United States.