首页> 外文期刊>Georgetown Journal of International Law >THE LIMITS OF THE CAROLINE DOCTRINE IN THE NUCLEAR CONTEXT: ANTICIPATORY SELF-DEFENSE AND NUCLEAR COUNTER-PROLIFERATION
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THE LIMITS OF THE CAROLINE DOCTRINE IN THE NUCLEAR CONTEXT: ANTICIPATORY SELF-DEFENSE AND NUCLEAR COUNTER-PROLIFERATION

机译:核环境中Caroline的局限性:抗性的自我辩护和对核扩散

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The international law doctrine of self-defense has traditionally been defined by the United Nations Charter and the customary international law doctrine from the Caroline case. Under this standard, force cannot be used in anticipation of a pending military attack unless such use of force is necessary to combat an imminent attack. This Note argues that, in the nuclear context, this doctrine is insufficient. Once an aggressor nation has developed a nuclear program, any action taken in self-defense could result in nuclear war or other catastrophe. Requiring that states wait until this point in order to exercise their self-defense rights would effectively eliminate the right of self-defense in this context. The last few decades have seen two military actions taken against developing nuclear programs with the Israeli military strikes on the Iraqi nuclear reactor in 1981 and the Syrian nuclear facilities in 2007. In the wake of the 1981 Iraq strike, scholars began to question whether the Caroline doctrine warrants reconsideration. The international silence following the strike on the Syrian facilities further provides support that the doctrine is ripe for change due to a shift in state practice. Because of the insufficiency of the current doctrine, and the shifts in both state practice and the views of scholars, this Note proposes a new doctrine that is both workable and provides a reasonable limit on the use of force in line with the goals of the United Nations Charter. As exhibited through the example of Iran, this proposed doctrine would allow for a military strike in anticipatory self-defense against nuclear programs being developed by an aggressor state when the nuclear program is imminent, rather than requiring that states wait until the program has developed and an actual nuclear attack is imminent.
机译:自卫的国际法学说传统上是由《联合国宪章》和卡罗琳案中的习惯国际法学说来定义的。根据该标准,除非为应对即将来临的攻击而必须使用武力,否则不得将其用于即将发生的军事攻击。本说明认为,在核背景下,该学说是不够的。一旦侵略国制定了核计划,采取任何自卫行动都可能导致核战争或其他灾难。要求各国等到这一点才能行使其自卫权,才能有效地消除这种情况下的自卫权。在过去的几十年中,以色列针对1981年对伊拉克核反应堆的军事打击以及2007年对叙利亚核设施的军事打击,采取了两项军事行动来打击发展核计划。在1981年伊拉克打击之后,学者开始质疑加洛林是否原则值得重新考虑。叙利亚设施罢工后的国际沉默进一步证明,由于国家实践的转变,该学说已经为变革做好了。由于当前理论的不足,以及国家实践和学者观点的转变,本注释提出了一种既可行又可以合理限制使用符合联合国目标的武力的新理论联合国宪章。正如通过伊朗的例子所展示的那样,这种拟议的学说将允许对侵略国在即将到来的核计划制定的核计划进行预期自卫时进行军事打击,而不是要求各州等到该计划制定和实施后再进行军事打击。实际的核攻击迫在眉睫。

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