Emotional Base of America's Military-Industrial Complex

摘要

As American troops test their latest doctrine and equipment in the streets of Iraq, William Greider and James Der Derian s critiques may seem unpatriotic. (Let's face it, their self-immolating polemics do not represent the best in unbiased social-scientific research.) But particularly during the first war of the 21st century, the key questions posed by each deserve attention. Greider asks if we should continue to subsidize what Eisenhower dubbed the 'military-industrial complex,' while Der Derian wonders if our relentless pursuit for high-speed and 'virtual' battlefield technology has not undermined our capacity for objective thought. Greider s arguments are chiefly economic. We cannot afford to run the existing inventory of tanks, ships and aircraft built to fight a now-defunct opponent even as we replace them with new versions built at a much higher marginal cost. We have an exaggerated redundancy of killing power' ('at least 10 ways to hit 65 percent of the thousands of expected ground targets in two major regional conflicts,' according to the General Accounting Office). The money spent on training for these redundant systems provides few collateral benefits (increasing the employment prospects for 'working class recruits, for example). Industrial restructuring nameplate consolidation, outsourcing, and 'lean manufacturing has left 'an oligopoly of three mammoth corporations' using all of their political and market power to keep their 'rent- 1 free' factories 'warm' at perhaps only one-third capacity. We allow these ailing giants to export, fortifying future adversaries like China. And as stock prices fall, the Pentagon cannot afford to let these companies fail. The self-licking ice cream cone' that is the Congress of the United States prevents the closure of redundant factories and is satisfied by minor reforms, such as procuring a few items 'off the shelf.'