Preparing for War, Stumbling to Peace. Planning for Post-Conflict Operations in Iraq

摘要

This monograph discusses planning for the post-conflict phase of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. More specifically, it examines whether a disparate focus on war-fighting operations during the planning and execution phase of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM is to blame for the lack of progress towards reconstruction. The purpose of this paper is to assess whether planning for Operation IRAQI FREEDOM devoted sufficient attention to the likely requirements of the post-conflict environment. It will analyze whether the failure to plan for this environment exposed realization of the strategic objectives to unnecessary risk. The hypothesis is that the challenges post-conflict Iraq poses to the coalition result, in part, from the failure to anticipate, collaborate and prepare. Could the likely challenges of post-Saddam Iraq have been anticipated. Did government departments and experts collaborate internally and externally to mitigate these challenges. Finally, did political and military leaders prepare thoroughly to meet the ordeals of the post-conflict environment. These three aspects are the criteria against which the performance of the United States Army during the planning and execution of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM are measured. The monograph concludes that the challenges of post-war Iraq were foreseeable if the political and military leadership had collaborated inside and outside of government. Moreover, the failure to properly anticipate and collaborate affected negatively the way in which units prepared for Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. The study suggests that a combination of flawed mental models, groupthink amongst the senior political and military leadership, and military culture are, in part, to blame. Planners cannot affect many of the factors that shape the environment in which they work.