Constitutional War Powers: The Functional Relevance of the War Powers Debate

摘要

The residence of Constitutional war powers has been defined by the functional execution of war powers, which has been almost entirely that of the executive, not by the interpretation of the original intent of the Framers of the Constitution. The debate on where the Constitutional authority to make war resides has revolved around three distinct interpretations of the Framers' original intent: the supremacy of the executive, the supremacy of the legislature, and the collective judgment of both in making war. The conclusion of World War II marked the last time that Congress formalized a relationship of hostility through a declaration of war. Since then, the introduction of U.S. Armed Forces into hostilities has been done entirely on the prerogatives of the executive. Every post-World War II President has entered U.S. Armed Forces into hostilities, often absent of Congressional participation and occasionally in direct contravention to Congressional desire. Each of these introductions of U.S. Armed Forces into hostilities furthered the war powers debate, which evolved to include the implication of U.S. participation in mutual security arrangements, such as the United Nations and NATO, and the success and resultant popularity of the military action in question. In an effort to protect its participation in war making decisions, Congress enacted legislation, first in the form of amendments to appropriations bills and later with the War Powers Act of 1973. This legislation, though, has had little effect on the functional supremacy of executive war powers. Each time that U.S. Armed Forces were introduced into hostilities following World War II, the Presidents all maintained their executive prerogative. As such, they defined through function that the decision to introduce U.S. Armed Forces into hostilities rests solely with the President, regardless of individual interpretations of the Framers' original intent.