From the Ashes of the Phoenix: Lessons for Contemporary Counterinsurgency Operations

摘要

For five years during the Vietnam War, as part of its counterinsurgency strategy, the United States executed an attack, code named the Phoenix Program, against the Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI). The VCI were the estimated 100,000 clandestine operatives living within South Vietnamese society that supported the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese units in the field. They performed recruiting, financing, political indoctrination, intelligence collection, and logistical support tasks. It was not until 1967 that a concerted effort was made to neutralize this component of the insurgency. As the program developed over time, it was extremely effective and severely hindered the insurgency's ability to support operations against the regime. Today, the United States is faced with another insurgency, conducted by militant Islamic fundamentalist organizations that seek the overthrow of friendly regimes, the reestablishment of an Islamic caliphate, and the eventual overthrow of Western civilization. This paper argues that as part of its counterinsurgency effort against this threat, the United States must neutralize the militant Islamic infrastructure (MI2) that enables the insurgency's global attacks. The paper provides an overview of the Phoenix Program, outlines the nature of the current insurgent threat, and identifies critical strategic lessons from the Vietnam experience that should be applied to a modern day Phoenix Program.