Impact of Technology on the Command, Control, and Organizational Structure of Insurgent Groups.

摘要

Recent world events in Iraq have highlighted the power of insurgent groups in battling a more powerful opponent like the United States. Some reports have characterized the insurgency in Iraq as a technology-empowered, network-centric organization without a defined command and control structure, while others have painted the insurgency as an undefined hierarchical organization. This thesis attempts to answer the following questions: Has technology changed the way the Iraq insurgency operates; How are insurgent groups employing information technology for command and control; and What commonalities existed among the command and control structures of past insurgencies. Three historical examples, the Front for National Liberation in Algeria, the Irish Republican Army in Ireland, and the Vietcong in South Vietnam, illustrate how insurgent groups have used technology for command and control. These historical examples are compared with reported trends in insurgent organization and insurgent activity in Iraq. The author concludes that, although Iraqi insurgents attempt to utilize technology for command and control, they must revert to the same methods used by past insurgent groups because the United States and coalition forces enjoy superiority in the area of information technology. This work also endeavors to provide an overview of U.S. unconventional warfare doctrine, which is modeled after past insurgencies. U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine was developed almost 40 years ago to counter communist insurgencies, and there have been very few changes to this doctrine in the years following the Vietnam War.