Chinese National Security Decisionmaking Under Stress

摘要

If there is one constant in expert analyses of the history of modern China, it is the characterization of a country perpetually in the throes of crises. And in nearly all crises, the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) has played an instrumental role. While China at the mid-point of the 21st century's first decade is arguably the most secure and stable it has been in more than a century, crises continue to emerge with apparent frequency. Consequently, the study of China's behavior in conditions of tension and stress, and particularly how the PLA is a factor in that behavior, is of considerable importance to policymakers and analysts around the world. This volume represents the fruits of a conference held at the U.S. Army War College in September 2004 on the theme of 'Chinese Crisis Management.' One of the major debates that emerged among participants was whether all the case studies under examination constituted crises in the eyes of China's leaders. The consensus was that not all of these incidents were perceived as crises-a key case in point being the three Iraq wars (1980-88, 1990-91, and 2003). As a result, the rubric of 'decisionmaking under stress' was adopted as presenters revised their papers for publication. No matter what rubric is employed, however, the chapters in this volume shed light on patterns of Chinese behavior in crisis- like situations and decisionmaking under stress. Michael Swaine's contributed chapter first establishes a general framework for understanding crisis management based on previous work by Alexander George and J. Philip Rogers. He then proceeds to apply this framework to Chinese crisis management in particular. Swaine identifies five basic variables that influence crisis management behavior-subjective views of leaders and public, domestic environment, decisionmaking structure, information receipt and processing, and idiosyncratic features.