Post-Conflicts Stability Operations and the 1989 United States Invasion of Panama

摘要

This study investigates the challenges of planning stability operations after major combat operations. Post-conflict stability operations are difficult to plan and execute if military commanders and campaign planners do not take a comprehensive approach to this critical facet of a campaign. This study uses the 1989 United States invasion of Panama to explore the complexities of planning post-conflict stability operations and identifies three crucial resources planners and commanders should be able to leverage to plan and execute post-conflict stability operations: doctrine, manpower, and interagency cooperation. Prior to the invasion of Panama, post-conflict stability doctrine was almost nonexistent; manpower problems plagued the planning staffs and hampered the execution of needed stability operations; and the military applied an exclusive military solution to a political-military situation. Although some of these issues have been addressed during the past two decades, there is still room for improvement. A military may defeat an enemy, but a nation can only achieve the desired national end state if it fully leverages all instruments of national power.