Cyberdeterrence Between Nation-States: Plausible Strategy Or A Pipe Dream

摘要

Can deterrence strategies which have helped avert great-power war since the late 1940s similarly prevent attempts at corrupting, disrupting, or destroying a nation-state's vital information infrastructure. Is it even possible to deter state-executed or state-sponsored computer network attacks against the governmental, military, financial, industrial, and civil information systems upon which modern society relies so heavily. It seems intuitive that one nation-state could plausibly threaten another with debilitating punishment should the latter conduct a major 'cyber attack' against the former. Examining computer network warfare characteristics, however, reduces one's optimism that even the most powerful states can deter strategic- level cyber attacks using the same methods that deter nuclear and conventional adventurism. While the threat of punishment certainly has a role in 'cyberdeterrence' between nation-states, the defining variable in an aggressor's decision making will likely be whether or not the defending state can credibly retain use of its most potent tools of national power despite being subjected to an intense 'cyber offensive.'.