Statistical Irrelevance of American SIGACT Data: Iraq Surge Analysis Reveals Reality

摘要

General David Petraeus brought the 'Petraeus Doctrine' to the Iraqi War. His doctrine included the concepts of increased base dispersion, increased local national partnering at the tactical and operational level, hostile party reconciliation, co-option of the Sunni population, local defense initiatives such as Sons of Iraq, and an increase in civil-military operations to name a few. However, due to the clearly quantifiable nature of troop numbers and U.S. citizens' concern for its soldiers, this comprehensive change in strategy was dubbed 'The Surge.' The title has caused policy makers, defense professionals, and citizens to associate counterinsurgency success with troop numbers rather than policies that begin to address the root causes of insurgency. This article summarizes the findings of a statistical and geospatial study that demonstrate the absence of a strong connection between troop increases and increased security in Iraq. The report compares troops and security year by year, accounts for lag time, charts changes, and presents a low correlation of .14 between troop increases and increased security in Iraq from 2006-2008. This low correlation empirically proves that 'other variables,' such as those in the 'Petraeus Doctrine' or environmental conditions, have a far greater effect on counterinsurgency success than troop surges. 'The Surge' strategy involved a troop increase and a myriad of policy variables. The study does not seek to identify the key variable responsible for improved security in 2007, rather, it seeks to rule out troops as the significant variable; therein reducing its blanket application to future counterinsurgencies. The study concludes with a discussion of the perception that 'surges solve insurgencies' and the consequent implications for Afghanistan.