Negotiating with the North Koreans: The U.S. Experience at Panmunjom.

摘要

This paper addresses the circumstances and negotiating posture surrounding two major confrontations between the United States and North Korea--the Pueblo Incident of 23 January 1968 and the 18 August Incident (1976). During the Peublo negotiations it became apparent that the US would have to accede to the North Korean conditions--a signed apology document--if it wanted the 82 crewmen back alive. In the 1976 negotiations the North Koreans backed down and made concessions in the Joint Security Area at Panmunjom inasmuch as the United Nations Command had photographs showing the North Korean acts of brutality and had responded with a show of military strength immediately after the incident. Negotiations over these two incidents demonstrate that the North Koreans will negotiate when threatened or when they hope to gain important concessions not otherwise available. North Korea seeks the appearance of legitimacy and respects power and force more than law and international norms of conduct. The US should avoid situations where its officials may be taken hostage by the North Koreans and should at all times provide some means for documenting North Korean violations of international law.